

**NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1998** 

Building Air Force Teams Today...

Supporting the Air and Space Force of Tomorrow



Signature Article
Brig. Gen. Francis X. Taylor writes about the "smart partnering" initiatives the AFOSI is undertaking to support the air and space force of tomorrow.

Do you know
what's on the
chief's mind?
Check out the
NOTAMS at
www.issues.af.mil

An Investigation in Our Midst

Key tips for commanders and 
"first shirts" to follow when a criminal investigation is conducted in your unit.

Tuberculosis
A look at what Air Force members should know about tuberculosis.

Creating a Year 2000
Readiness Mindset
Raising awareness concerning
Year 2000 problems and developing a Year 2000
operational readiness "warplan."

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#### on our cover

F-15E Strike Eagles taxi at sunset.

Digital illustration by Danita Burns based on an original photo by Master Sgt. Dave Nolan.

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ast month we welcomed a new Inspector General, Lt. Gen. Nicholas B. Kehoe. who arrived from an assignment in Brussels where he was the military deputy to NATO. Gen. Kehoe brings a wealth of Air Force experience to The Inspector General's position and we are fortunate to have him as our new "TIG."

Recent changes in inspector general training have been implemented to enhance support to commanders and members of our Air Force community. The new five-day Basic Installation IG Course at Andrews Air Force Base, Md. has just graduated it's fourth class with exceptional student reviews. Coupled with the twoday Investigating Officers Course which is being offered at different sites in the CONUS and overseas. these schools arm IGs and IOs at wing and MAJCOM levels with the tools to successfully support field commanders.
MAJCOMs fill slots by forwarding school nominees on-line to SAF/IGQ at http://www.ig.hq.af.mil.

Also, TIG Brief is in the process of change. It needs to support you, our Air Force community, with practical, timely and concise information to better do our jobs. To that end, we have asked wings and MAJCOMs to share tips and lessons learned from inspectors, quality assurance sections, commanders and members at large from current experiences. Credit for contributions or nonattribution, as desired, will be given. Format will be changing to a hard-hitting and easier to digest layout with the emphasis on useful information that is short and to the point.

For example, if you're returning from SWA, do you need a tuberculosis test? Why? What if you test positive? What does it mean? Also, what's the latest in ORI deployed credit? Who's getting it? How long is it good for? The *TIG Brief* is your magazine — please help us make it work for you.

As we enter this fall season, Gen. Ryan's initiatives to enhance expeditionary airpower, reduce **OPSTEMPO** and garner the fiscal resources needed to improve pay, retirement and readiness are bearing fruit. These welcomed efforts bear tribute to the service and sacrifices made every day by our **total** force Air Force. Best wishes to you all for a safe and happy holiday season.

> Deputy Inspector General

Melfred Denest



By Brig. Gen. Francis X. Taylor

he Air Force Office of Special Investigations' four command priorities embody the key areas where the Air Force leadership expects AFOSI to place priority attention on our core investigative capability. As an organization constantly striving to meet the ever-changing needs of our nation and our Air Force, we have come to realize that we can no longer afford to perform our difficult and demanding mission alone in a vacuum.

In as much as we live in an era of dwindling resources, with increased expectations to perform whenever and wherever we are needed, we must all find new ways to exploit each other's capabilities to accomplish our mission objectives. For AFOSI, the answer lies in the concept of "smart partnering." By forming partnerships with other agencies and organizations that can

enhance the capabilities we are expected to possess, AFOSI has had great success in meeting the challenges presented by our command priorities and as a result have been far better able to serve our nation and our Air Force.

AFOSI's first command priority is to exploit counterintelligence activities for force protection. In terms of smart partnering, we have teamed up with the 820<sup>th</sup> Security Forces Group at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, to provide a more robust counterintelligence capability. By having our **Antiterrorism Specialty Team** train side by side with security forces, we have enhanced both organizations' ability to deliver critical force protection services to the warfighter.

At the same time, we are improving our AST's experience levels and making them a more credible asset. But don't just take my word for it. The proof of our success with smart partnering is in the rave reviews of our deployed commanders — the ones who need us most.

Smart partnering has also aided AFOSI in the accomplishment of our second command priority; to solve violent crime impacting our Air Force. The relationships we have formed with support group commanders, chaplains and the Surgeon General's office have netted tremendous benefits in suicide awareness. Realizing that these matters are of interest to our customers, our close cooperative efforts have resulted in the production of several special studies on suicides and other important topics such as sexual assault by authority figures. Most importantly, our partnership has yielded very effective suicide prevention programs that arguably have served to diminish the incidence of this tragic and senseless loss of life.

Accomplishment of the third AFOSI command priority, combating threats to our information systems and technologies, has benefited equally as much from the formation of high performance teams. Intrusions into computer systems present a major threat to Air Force operations worldwide and will continue to do so

well into the next millennium. Our recent SOLAR SUNRISE investigation demonstrated quite clearly how teaming up with our counterparts to reach a common objective can meet with resounding success. In that instance, members of AFOSI, the Air Force Information Warfare Center, FBI, NASA and a host of others forged an alliance that in 42 days resolved a serious attempt to exploit and damage the cyber infrastructure of the United States. With the likelihood that the threat from cyberspace will become even more invasive in the future, it is all too clear that further success in combating it will require much more of the same cooperation and teamwork. AFOSI will be a key part of our future Computer Network Defense Joint Task Force and the National Infrastructure Protection Center at the FBI.

Finally, the fourth AFOSI command priority is to defeat and deter acquisition fraud. This command priority mandates that we protect the very resources the Air Force and AFOSI require to operate. Could there be a better reason for seeking out those that could aid us in accomplishing this task? As such, through the years AFOSI has made and continually nurtures relationships with the FBI, Air Force contracting officials and finan-

cial managers, the Air Force Audit Agency and many others. We believe that smart partnering with these key organizations is crucial to our success in protecting Air Force resources — base level or central systems. Going one step further, just this year AFOSI hosted the very first Defense Criminal Investigative Organization Fraud Conference. The main purpose of this landmark conference was to address our vision for mutual cooperation between our agencies.

Like many other organizations, AFOSI is faced with myriad challenges. Only those organizations that come up with new and innovative methods to address those challenges will remain relevant to our Air Force in the future. For AFOSI, "smart partnering" is the key to meeting the needs of our great nation and Air Force. By building Air Force teams today, we are assuring the success of an air and space force of tomorrow.

Francis X. Fayl

Air Force Office of Special Investigations commander

# An Investigation in Our Midst

ada, yada, yada! You know the textbook answers. AFOSI provides counterintelligence, antiterrorism support and liaison with host nation security forces for the deployed warfighter. But what about criminal investigations within your unit? Knowing that AFOSI is conducting an investigation within your unit certainly can be disconcerting for a commander or first sergeant; however, you can deal more effectively with an investigation in your unit when communication and operational security are the keys. •

#### **COMMUNICATE**

Effective and timely communication between the commander and AFOSI is essential in maintaining the integrity of the investigation and the unit's mission capability. Investigations thrive on information. Anything you can do to provide accurate information is paramount.

#### **AFOSI needs to know:**

- Accurate information about unit operations and personnel.
- ♦ Upcoming events that could impact the investigation or unit. Events such as inspections, leaves, shift changes, changes in duties, PCSs, TDYs, promotion boards or social events.
- Media queries or briefings you are asked to give about an investigation. Advise AFOSI as to whom and when you need to brief anyone concerning an investigation.

Try to alleviate concerns or fear in the workplace while an investigation is taking place. Ease the tension by letting your people know that AFOSI is not involved in sentencing. AFOSI will solely investigate allegations of wrongdoing and forward them to the commander. In many cases, there may be little or no evidence to back up claims of wrongdoing, which means the allegations may be disproved.

As commander, you may and should ask questions and voice your concerns about the investigation, unit operations or personnel. Your observations are important to the investigation and your unit!

#### **OPSEC TIPS**

Operations security is alive and well when working an investigation. Take care when speaking about any case.

#### **Always:**

- Be cognizant of who could overhear your conversations about the investigation.
- ⚠ Make it a habit to only discuss AFOSI matters behind closed doors. If you don't feel comfortable talking in your office with agents, ask to meet them at the AFOSI office. Don't discuss the investigation, even in the most vague terms, in hallways or public areas.
- ♠ Avoid using a speakerphone when discussing AFOSI matters. Limit discussions on any phone especially those with extensions.
- ♠ Keep any notes or files on the matter secured so that only you have access to them. Don't leave this information unattended, even for a short time.
- ♣ Don't place information concerning AFOSI investigations in a computer or transmit any information via E-mail.
- ② If you must fax information, prior to doing so ensure the intended recipient is at the receiving fax machine ready to immediately take the fax from the machine before anyone sees the information.
- ♣ Personally deliver information to the intended recipient — don't use office distribution, leave documents on desks or in distribution boxes or leave voice messages.

Information for this article was compiled from data provided by AFOSI special agents.

## coordinate


Coordinate with AFOSI any actions you feel you should take which may affect the investigation. Many routine matters may arise which could easily affect an investigation. For example:

- What do you do if the subject of an investigation receives PCS notification?
- What action do you take if the subject of a theft investigation is apprehended for DWI?
- Should you allow a subject or witness to go TDY?
- What if a victim of a violent crime begins to exhibit erratic behavior?
- What do you do if one of your subordinates comes to you and starts to provide information concerning the investigation?
  When in doubt, talk to AFOSI as soon as possible. The bottom line is not to handle the situation through routine channels as this may compromise the investigation or the reputation of the person involved. By working together, commanders and AFOSI can more effectively address these issues.

What if you learn of a crime or situation before AFOSI does? It is not unusual for a commander or first sergeant to learn of a situation or crime before AFOSI but your initial response is extremely critical. Of primary importance is providing aid to the injured, protecting national security resources and notifying law enforcement along with AFOSI. In any matter that may warrant an AFOSI investigation, commanders are cautioned against taking any investigative action other than what is needed to evaluate the situation and notify law enforcement. Commanders and "first shirts" should avoid:

- ♠ Entering crime scenes, handling evidence (including examining files on a computer) or interviewing, even casually, witnesses or suspects. Also, try not to let key witnesses leave the area.
- Making any comments as to what you believed happened or whom you feel may be responsible. As soon as you can, establish a written record of your actions because these could become part of a detailed investigation.

Yes, it can be unsettling to have an investigation in the midst of getting the mission done but, with open lines of communication, you can help build a conducive working relationship with AFOSI and effectively deal with an investigation in your unit.





#### **Program Integration Responsibilities**

Line and medical commanders must closely integrate efforts to accomplish a project as massive as the Department of Defense-directed total force vaccination. Department of Defense policy specifically lists certain responsibilities to assure ontime administration, tracking and documentation.

#### Wing Commanders:

- ► Ensure the wing-level personnel readiness unit maintains deployed and re-deployed personnel accountability.
- Revise deployment procedures to ensure anthrax vaccine series is administered to deploying personnel.
- ► Ensure unit deployment managers schedule and monitor personnel in priority positions who require the anthrax vaccination.
- Ensure squadron commanders assign and direct personnel to complete the immunization series as required.
- ► Ensure the medical treatment facility is on all outprocessing and inprocessing checklists to assure timely administration and centralized tracking.

#### Medical Immunization Tracking System administrators:

- ➤ Verify immunization status of all re-deployed personnel.
- ▶ Provide unit readiness monitors weekly immunization status rosters to verify accuracy and to notify individuals of required immunizations.

# Anthrax

The Anthrax Vaccine Protects Against a Lethal Weapon

by **Lt. Col. Barry L. Simon** HQ AFIA/SGI DSN 246-2548 simonb@kafb.saia.af.mil

he current world threat environment and the unpredictable nature of terrorism demand effective preexposure vaccination against deadly biological warfare agents. The anthrax vaccination program is a Department of Defense-directed force protection policy, a program designed to protect you. The policy is a result of lessons learned from the Gulf War. Studies determined that a significant deficiency was found in our ability to protect U.S. forces from a biological attack. As a result, we have produced and stockpiled a safe and effective vaccine to protect our forces against anthrax, the greatest biological threat agent as

# Contemporary Issues in the Air Force

Ninety-nine percent of unprotected individuals exposed to battlefield concentrations of the anthrax agent would die.

# Vaccine Protects

confirmed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Anthrax is a naturally occurring disease of sheep, cattle, horses, goats and pigs. Anthrax spores can be produced in a dry form, which may be stored and ground into particles. When inhaled by humans, these particles cause respiratory failure and death within a week. Human infections are rare and are usually related to handling meat or fur infected with the bacillus. Farm and tannery workers, veterinarians, and wool processors are the peacetime civilian occupations at risk.

The anthrax vaccine is not new. A human anthrax vaccine was developed over 40 years ago and was licensed by the Food and Drug Administration in 1970.

In fact, the vaccine was also used to immunize approximately 150,000 people during



Brig. Gen. Mark Schmidt, 366th Wing commander, Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, receives the first of a series of anthrax vaccinations.

the Gulf War. (Several national scientific groups, including the National Academy of Sciences, exhaustively researched the anthrax vaccine link with illnesses among Gulf War veterans. They found no association between receiving anthrax vaccine and the

"Gulf War Illness" or other long-term health effects.)

Anthrax can be produced easily and inexpensively in large quantities, can be easily developed as a weapon and can spread over a large area. Southwest Asia and the Korean Peninsula are the high-risk areas on the imme-

Please see ANTHRAX next page ▶



#### **Anthrax Vaccine Protects continued**

diate radar screen and are the two theaters for anthrax vaccination inauguration. Anthrax can be deployed in numerous ways from simple spray devices to ballistic missiles. Biological agents are often difficult to detect, symptoms are delayed and without preventive medical efforts, such as vaccination, the results can be devastating and widespread.

The anthrax organism, *Bacillus anthracis*, is 99 percent lethal and can be stored for a long time and still remain deadly.

Being fully vaccinated greatly increases the chances of survival if exposed to anthrax. Other measures, especially the mechanical barrier protection afforded by a chemical/ biological protective mask, also improve survivability. The vaccine promotes increased resistance to anthrax by active immunization. The recipient develops protection by means of antibodies and other immune mechanisms to the bacterium following immunization. If exposed before gaining immunity, starting antibiotics within 24 hours after airborne anthrax exposure also provides significant protection in

animal studies.

Identifying and treating every potentially exposed individual with antibiotics is not feasible. Biological agents are typically difficult to detect and treatment after illness develops is much less effective. The devastating fact is — without the anthrax vaccination the result can be deadly. •

## Getting Shot Doesn't Kill

he Department of Defense mass immunization program is projected to occur in three phases. The first phase began in August 1998 and includes "highest risk" personnel in high-threat areas of Southwest and Northeast Asia,

personnel rotating into these units and personnel on temporary duty in these areas. Units tasked in deliberate operations plans for early deployment into high-threat areas will be vaccinated in Phase II. Phase III is total force immunization.

The FDA approved a sixshot schedule for this vaccine. Primary immunization consists of three injections given two weeks apart (meaning at zero, two and four weeks) followed by three additional injections given at six, 12 and 18 months.

Note: personnel do not need to re-start the entire procedure at dose one for any reason. Exception: personnel who received less than six doses of anthrax vaccine during Operation Desert Storm or Desert Shield service.

The anthrax vaccine provides effective protection two weeks after the third inoculation (95 percent will be protected after the first three doses). Full protection results from the six-shot series given over 18 months. Annual booster injections maintain the immunity.

Contrary to popular belief promulgated in public media, the part of the bacteria against which the vaccine was made is the same in all strains of anthrax. The vaccine is safe. There is no evidence from records at the Michigan Biologic Products Institute, Lansing, Mich., developer and manufacturer of the vaccine, that anthrax vaccine absorbed (injected) is associated with chronic or permanent local or systemic effects. You cannot be infected with anthrax from the immunizations.

Reported side effects are mostly limited to mild local reactions. A small red ring around the injection site and slight local tenderness, occur in approximately 30 percent of recipients. Chills and fever have been reported in only a few cases and there have been no long-term side effects reported.

Anthrax vaccine should be administered only to healthy people between 18 and 65 years old. Although the vaccine may be safe for other ages, information exists only for that group.

Service members do not

have a choice as to whether or not they want to receive the vaccination. This series of immunizations will be treated the same as other required vaccinations, unless medically deferred. Those members refusing the vaccination will face disciplinary action.

Medically deferred personnel include pregnant women and persons with temporarily suppressed immune systems (e.g. from drugs such as cortico-steroids).

The threat of biological weapons of mass destruction exists. Force protection with anthrax vaccination is effective and prudent.

Although the six-dose series spread over 18 months may be inconvenient to you, the Department of Defense cannot allow a disease, preventable with a simple immunization series, to negatively affect our most precious resource – our troops.

An infection exists in animals in the Republic of Korea causing active human infections almost every summer.

# TIG Bits...

#### **The Switch**

Cards cannot be used before one minute after midnight Nov. 30 Greenwich Mean Time. All American Express card accounts will be turned off midnight Nov. 29. American Express cards do not have to be returned to the company but should be cut up and destroyed. Traveling members on temporary duty Nov. 29 and 30 should carry both their American Express and Visa travel cards.

NationsBank began mailing new Visa travel cards Oct. 15 and will continue through Nov. 15

# The Nations Bank Visa like an American Exprand is intended for off

#### **Visa program fees**

- 1.9 percent ATM fee
- \$20 returned personal check fee
- ◆ \$20 per billing cycle will be charged to all accounts over 120 days delinquent
- If an account is turned over to a collection agency, a fee of up to 25 percent of the delinquent amount may be charged.

#### **Cardholders' duties**

Cardholders must take two actions when they receive the Visa card.

- 1. Activate the new card by calling NationsBank at 1-800-311-7810. Those overseas can call collect, 1-757-441-4124. These numbers will also be provided on the back of the new Visa card and on a card sleeve that comes with the card.
- 2. Read, sign and mail back the cardholder agreement in the self-addressed stamped envelope provided in the new card packet.







Some bases are having cards bulk delivered to the agency program coordinator, or APC, for distribution by units or the base APC directly to the traveling member. APCs will notify personnel if their base is receiving bulk card delivery.

CANCEL

#### **Travel voucher tip**

Check the split disbursement block [Block1. Payment] on the travel settlement voucher. This way, the finance office will pay the amount owed to NationsBank directly with the remainder of the balance going directly to the cardholder's bank account by electronic fund transfer. This split disbursement feature will save you time and make bill payment easier. [The split disbursement block is on DD Form 1351-2, dated Aug. 1997.]

# card works just ess charge card

icial travel only.

For more information, contact unit APCs or visit <a href="http://www.nationsbank.com/government/">http://www.nationsbank.com/government/</a>

# **Electronic account government ledger system**

EAGLS is the NationsBank answer to the Department of Defense request for automated software for travel card management. It is an Internet based Windows program. EAGLS is highly secure at multiple levels, can support a large number of simultaneous users and Department networks can connect to it. Minimum hardware and software requirements to run EAGLS include 486 processor, 16 RAM, Windows 95 or Windows version 3.1, Netscape 3.0 or Internet Explorer 3.02. It is built for agency program coordinator and cardholder use, although cardholder access will be deferred until January 1999. It can be used to obtain reports, do all card maintenance such as: activate/deactivate cards, input charge and cash limits, check balances, etc. The information provided by EAGLS is near real time data. It is anticipated that EAGLS should almost eliminate the need for paper products, and provide greater flexibility in managing the program.

TRANSACTION RE

INE

NationsBank will use the third day of each month as the cut-off date for all Air Force travelers' billing cycle.

#### **Activation**

Some cards will require APC intervention to activate. The cardholder information packet will identify these cards. If this is the case, the cardholder is responsible for contacting the APC who must turn these cards on and off.

#### Two card types

The new program will have a standard and restricted card. Those in good standing with American Express and those who pass the credit check will be issued a standard card. This card has an initial limit of \$5,000 available, \$500 ATM cash limit and a \$250 retail limit. These limits can be raised as high as \$10,000 by the APC if necessary.

#### **Restricted cards**

The restricted card will be issued to people who decline the credit check. The credit limit is \$1,250 with an ATM cash limit of \$250 and a retail limit of \$50. The APC must activate these cards with each temporary duty. The **commander** can raise or lower the limits as necessary.

Every Air Force traveler with an American Express card not suspended or canceled is eligible to receive the new Visa travel card. How does your organization measure up?

# **Air Mobility Command Ability to Survive and Operate**



Master Sgt. B. Eric Brooks and Master Sgt. Harley M. Connors brooks@hqamc.scott.af.mil connorm@hqamc.scott.af.mil HQ AMC/IGISE DSN 576-2313

he ability to effectively operate in a chemical/biological environment continues to be an emphasis area for many units. The important principles of chemical and biological survival, if followed, should allow Air Force personnel to survive and operate. Most individuals know how to wear their chemical gear and can process though the contamination control area but often lack other essential skills such as contamination avoidance and control measures, post-attack sweeps, expedient decontamination and use of autoinjectors.

Improvements in these areas will enhance survival in a hostile environment. Your ability to survive and operate successfully saves lives and protects resources — directly enhancing mission capability in a contingency environment. The key to success is knowledge and preparation. Don't wait until the last minute to learn how to use your equipment or to practice procedures.

#### Following a chemical attack

here should be coordinated, systematic sweeps looking for unexploded ordnances, casualties, contamination, damage and fires. Realistically, small areas or pockets of contamination will exist.

• Contamination avoidance and control measures help limit the spread of contaminants in the area.

Techniques such as covering vital equipment and the use of shuffle boxes will greatly enhance this effort.

- If used properly and consistently, shuffle boxes and glove stations keep contaminants out of clean facilities, thus providing the best defense for personnel.
- Personnel should step into a container (shuffle box) containing a decontaminant, then use a brush to remove contaminants from the ensemble. After brushing down the entire suit, the gloves can be decontaminated in a glove station. Personnel should be able to step from the shuffle box directly into the clean facility, avoiding contact with potentially contaminated ground outside.

#### **Commanders:**

emical and biological princip

Find the optimum balance between limiting the number of personnel exposed during the sweep, the size of the area to be swept and the amount of time necessary to do the sweep. Obviously, the more people doing the sweep the shorter the time required. However, more people are potentially exposed to chemical or biological agents.

#### If contaminated

Personnel must know how to properly use:

- Personal decontamination kits such as the M258A1, M291 and M295 kits. Furthermore, since complete decontamination of an area is impossible, personnel need to understand the techniques and principle of operational decontamination. During inspections, a limited number of personnel, selected at random, will demonstrate expedient decontamination.
- Atropine and 2-pam-chloride autoinjectors. People do understand the principles of the nerve agent antidotes but cannot properly demonstrate their use when given an autoinjector simulator. These simulators might make a worthwhile addition for use during unit training sessions.

As a resource, we recommend the new Air Force Handbook 32-4014, Volume 4, <u>USAF Ability to</u> <u>Survive and Operate Procedures in a Nuclear,</u> <u>Biological, and Chemical Environment</u>. It is available through the Internet at the Air Force Publications site at http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/

#### BADGES? WE DON'T NEED NO LITTLE BADGES!

tems removed as of Oct. 1, 1998 from the uniform inventory are the satin and oxidized finished belt top and buckle; satin and oxidized finish badges and speciality insignia, both regular and miniature sizes; and the miniature highly polished and chrome finish badges and specialty insignia.

The only badges not affected by the phase out are the miniature wings, missile and fire protection badges and the security forces shield.

Amid questions on the proper wear of the miniature badges along with regular size badges, Staff Sgt. Randy Larson, noncommissioned officer in charge of Air Force dress and appearance stated, "the miniature wings, missile and fire protection badges as well as the security forces shield are authorized to wear with any other regular size aeronautical, occupational or duty badge."

Larson added that Air Force members are authorized to mix the regular size parachutist badge with the miniature wings and the miniature missile badge may be worn with a regular size occupational badge.

Questions concerning the badges can be directed to Staff Sgt. Larson at his E-mail address: randy.larson@ afpc.randolph.af.mil. \*

#### **CSAF APPROVES PHOENIX AVIATOR 20 PROGRAM**

en. Michael E. Ryan, Air Force chief of staff. recently approved a oneyear test period for a new program to help improve the services pilot retention woes. The Phoenix Aviator 20 program is designed to help Air Force pilot retirees transition to commercial airlines, thereby increasing the likelihood of pilots completing a full 20-year mili-

tary career, according to officials at the Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas. The PA20 Program will guarantee pilots a flying assignment in the last two years of their career.

To be eligible for the program, members must be a rated pilot in the grade of lieutenant colonel and below; have a total active federal military service



date in calendar year 1981; and be physically qualified to perform aircrew duties. The program also allows for a selected number of enrollees from the calendar year 1979 and 1980 year groups. Restrictions do apply. For more details on the program, check out AFPC's retention web site at http:// www.afpc.af.mil/retention/or contact PA20 office at DSN 487-7924.

## Running Numbers

#### \$625 million

Estimated cost to eradicate known Y2K problems in all Air Force systems.

source: AF Y2K office

As of Oct. 21, the number of Air Force members that have refused the anthrax vaccination series.

source: AF/SGI

The amount of increase to the minimum hazardous duty incentive pay for enlisted aviators.

source: AFNS

## Fraud in the Air Force



Maj. Steve Murray AFOSI/PA DSN 858-0989

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigates all types of fraud cases against the government. Fraud costs the Air Force millions of dollars annually. Most of our fraud investigations are in the procurement area: product substitution, diversion, mischarging, conflicts of interest and bribery. Other types of fraud involve military and civilian members who have been caught cheating the Air Force. In these budget-tightening days, the impact of fraud, waste and abuse is felt throughout the Air Force and we should all accept the responsibility to prevent it at every opportunity. Mutual command and AFOSI support, coupled with teamwork, are essential for successful prevention, detection and neutralization of fraud. Here are some examples.

#### **Environmental Crime**

Subject: Department of Defense Contractor

**Synopsis:** An investigation by AFOSI disclosed a Department of Defense contractor, tasked to provide asbestos abatement on a military installation, was found guilty of improper removal and disposal of asbestos containing waste material. The contractor was also found guilty of not providing proper training or personal protective gear for their employees during the abatement process.

**Result:** The contractor was found to be in violation of **Environmental Protection** Agency regulations governing the proper removal and disposition of asbestos containing material and was subsequently fined \$20,000 by the State and \$105,000 by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Civil fines through the Department of Justice are still pending.

Misappropriation of U.S. Air Force Funds

Subject: Air Force Noncommissioned Officer

Synopsis: An AFOSI investigation disclosed that an Air Force noncommissioned officer assigned to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service in Dayton, Ohio, misappropriated more than \$430,000 of Air Force funds. The noncommissioned officer accomplished the fraud by creating bogus invoices for equipment and directing the payments to personal accounts.

**Result:** The noncommissioned officer was found guilty by a general court-martial of five charges and 24 specifications for his acts. He was sentenced to 12 years confinement, dishonorable discharge, reduction to E-1 and forfeiture of all pay and allowances.

Conspiracy to Submit False Claims, Anti-Deficiency Act Violation and Bribery

**Subject:** Air Force Contractor and Furniture Moving Com-

Synopsis: An AFOSI investiga-

tion disclosed fraudulent charges in excess of \$1.3 million to a contract resulting from the misuse of a blanket purchase agreement for the movement of furniture and installation of systems furniture. An Anti-Deficiency Act violation occurred when an Air Force financial management staff member directed the contractor to continue work past the end of the fiscal year, even though funding had not been secured for the contract. The staff member directed the contractor to submit claims to indicate all work was completed prior to Oct. 1.

**Result:** The contractor pled guilty to one count of bribery of a public official and one count of conspiracy to defraud the government. The contractor was fined \$10,000, ordered to pay \$218,000 in restitution and was placed on three years probation. The Air Force member pled guilty to one count of bribery and is awaiting sentencing.

## **Summary of Recent Audits**



Mr. George Mellis AFAA/DOO DSN 426-8041

The Air Force Audit Agency provides professional and independent internal audit service to all levels of Air Force management. The reports summarized here discuss ways to improve the economy, effectiveness and efficiency of installation-level operations and, therefore, may be useful to you. Air Force officials may request copies of these reports or a listing of recently published reports by contacting Mr. George Mellis at the number below, E-mailing to reports@af.pentagon.mil, writing to HQ AFAA/DOO, 1125 Air Force Pentagon, Washington DC 20330-1125, or by accessing the AFAA home page at http://www.afaa.hq.af.mil/.

**Dormitory Management** audits at AFMC air logistics centers disclosed that personnel did not accurately establish and effectively monitor basic allowance for quarters and variable housing allowances. In addition, occupancy rates were not accurately reported, dormitory room inspections were not effectively performed, surplus property was not properly processed and fire protection systems were inadequate. The audit provided 25 recommendations to improve internal controls. In addition. management took immediate action to (1) develop new software to more effectively track the status of dormitory residents, (2) develop better procedures for processing hardship requests and monitoring inspection violations and (3) upgrade fire protection systems. Management's timely corrective actions should help to (1) eliminate unauthorized entitlements, (2) protect the health and safety of dormitory residents, (3) provide proper accountability of donated government property and (4)

prevent physical damage to dormitory assets. (*Reports of Audit 42598010 and DR098014*)

When auditors perfoming an audit of Small Arms and Munitions disclosed that armory personnel did not always accurately account for small arms, personnel took immediate action to account for them. Additionally, security force personnel did not always maintain current small arms qualifications. In response to this audit, management established a new centralized database tracking system, and the armory personnel now review the qualification roster and annotate which personnel have exceeded their qualification dates. A letter listing these unqualified personnel is posted with instructions not to arm them, eliminating the possibility of issuing weapons to unqualified personnel. (Report of Audit WN098013)

Airport Shuttle Service. AFAA auditors found that cost-efficient airport shuttle service was not established at an overseas installation. Specifically, the

shuttle operated without passengers on 43 of 96 trips reviewed. Auditors pointed out to management that, compared to other overseas bases, shuttle service was disproportionately high in comparison to base personnel supported. As a result of audit's recommendations, the airport shuttle frequency was reduced from six to three daily round trips. Auditors also noticed that airport shuttle service quality assurance controls could be improved. A quality assurance evaluator was not appointed and procedures were not established to properly certify invoices or verify proper vendor contract performance for the shuttle contract. The shuttle contractor collected, maintained, and delivered the logs to the traffic management officer, along with payment invoices, as the only support for vendor contract performance. Working with management, auditors recommended the appointment of a formal quality assurance evaluator and controls to improve the service. (Report of Audit ER098040)



n several occasions at inspector general conferences and meetings, I have been cornered by investigating officers who are convinced they have been given an impossible task. They have been asked to investigate a "one-on-one" incident without witnesses other than the complainant and subject. They are concerned that they may have to enter an "inconclusive" finding because, in their mind, one against one means neither side has a preponderance of evidence. Fortunately, that is not the case. An inconclusive finding, by its very nature, is of little use to anyone. It leaves the allegation unresolved and does not help the complainant, subject or the appointing authority come to grips with

the underlying problem which gave rise to the complaint. As a result, although Air Force Instruction 90-301, Inspector General Complaints, suggests that "inconclusive" findings are possible, an investigating officer should rarely, if ever, make such a finding. Moreover, if properly applying the standard of evidence applicable to IG investigations, he or she will not have to do so, but will in every case be able to affirmatively determine whether or not the allegation is "substantiated" or "unsubstantiated."

Under the current wording of AFI 90-301, paragraphs 1.3.4.3. and 1.8.1.3., an investigating officer's findings and conclusions must be supported by a preponderance of the evi-

dence. Attachment one of the instruction contains very useful definitions that should be closely read by every IG and investigating officer. A finding is substantiated when "a preponderance of the evidence supports (more likely to have occurred than not occurred), the complainant's allegation o[f] a wrong or violation of law, regulation or Air Force policy or standards." It is not substantiated when "a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the alleged wrongdoing did not occur."

An important aspect to making appropriate findings is to understand the definition in the instruction of preponderance of the evidence. "It is evidence which is of greater weight or which is more credible and con-

vincing to the mind than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is, evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable than not. The weight of the evidence supporting a particular fact is not [emphasis added] to be determined by the sheer number of witnesses or volume of evidentiary matter presented, but rather by that evidence which best accords with reason and probability." Important words and phrases include; "credible," "convincing," "more probable than not" and "that evidence which best accords with reason and probability." It is not the number of witnesses that is important, but the quality and substance of their testimony.

What can an investigating officer do when faced with our hypothetical one-on-one incident? First, make sure both witnesses have the opportunity to fully describe what they heard, saw or did. If their testimony relates to different sides of the same conversation, try to corroborate what they claim was said through other evidence. Next, analyze and compare both statements with other documentary and testimonial evidence in order to determine whether their statements are credible.

For the commander and investigating officer


convincing, reasonable and/or probable. Investigators should always apply their common sense and knowledge of the "ways of the world" to the evidence in addition to their training and experience. Finally, if the credibility of witnesses still remains an issue, then

an investigator should look for evidence of each witness' truthfulness or the lack of it. Has each witness' story remained consistent over time or has it changed? Does either witness have a motive to lie? What is each witness' reputation for truthfulness among his or her friends and co-workers?

By properly applying the preponderance of evidence standard in accordance with the above guidelines, investigators should be able to confidently determine that the available evidence makes a disputed fact "more probable than not," and thereby avoid useless "inconclusive" findings.

#### When faced with one-on-one incident

- ☐ Make sure both witnesses have the opportunity to fully describe what they heard, saw or did.
- ☐ Analyze and compare both statements with other documentary and testimonial evidence
- ☐ Look for evidence of each witness' truthfulness or lack of it.



#### What is Tuberculosis?

TB is a disease caused by a bacteria that can damage the lungs and other parts of the body.

#### How do 1 get TB?

TB is most often transmitted through the air from a coughing or sneezing person with an active TB lung infection.

#### How do 1 know if 1 have TB?

Most people are unaware that they have been exposed to TB until they get a TB skin test. As inactive TB progresses into active disease, mild respiratory symptoms such as cough or shortness of breath may develop. Following a positive skin test, chest X-rays and sputum tests are used to diagnose active TB.

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### What is the TB test? How often do 1 need it?

The TB skin test is the only widely used and accepted method of diagnosing TB. The test is administered by injecting a small amount of fluid just barely under the skin and then having a qualified individual read the test 48-72 hours after it is given. The test measures whether the body has been exposed to the bacteria. How often you need the test depends on your risk of exposure to TB. Healthcare workers and personnel who deploy frequently are usually at higher risk than other groups and require an annual TB skin test.

#### If I have TB, is it life threatening? Can it be treated?

TB is not life threatening when treated promptly. If a person has a positive skin test without active disease, then use of antibiotic treatment depends on the age, health status, and home and occupational environment of that person. People with inactive TB are most likely treated with an antibiotic medication by mouth for six months. If the patient has active TB, then multiple medications are required for longer periods of time. **Most** patients with active TB and those with a positive skin test can be cured if they take **all** medication prescribed by their doctor.

When 1 was deployed to Saudi Arabia, 1 overheard one of the medics talking about a disease he called MDR-TB. What is it, and am 1 at risk while deployed to SWA?

MDR-TB stands for multiple drug resistant tuberculosis and is present in Saudi Arabia and possibly other countries in Southwest Asia. Everyone deployed to SWA is at risk of exposure to MDR-TB, although the risk is fairly low. The bad news — it's more dangerous than the normal strains of TB because it is very difficult to treat. The good news — not one airman has developed active TB, to date, while deployed to SWA.

### My friend had a "false positive" TB skin test reaction. What is this and does she have TB?


A false positive is a reaction (redness or swelling) on your arm that is caused by something other than the skin test injection. It's crucial to have the skin test read 48-72 hours after it was given to avoid false positive or negative readings. If the test is read too soon, it may be interpreted as negative, when it isn't, because your body hasn't had enough time to develop a reaction. Reading a test too soon may also result in a false positive reading because some individuals develop redness or swelling around the injection site as a result of sensitivity to the fluid in the injection. This redness disappears well before the 48-hour point, but may be interpreted as a false positive if the test is read before 48 hours. On the other hand, if you wait too long to have your test read, a positive reaction may fade and will appear to be negative, when it's really positive. Irritation (i.e. scratching) or other injuries to the injection site can also give the appearance of a false positive TB test. Your friend probably does not have TB if the test was falsely positive. When there is doubt about the validity of the test results, the immunization technician will ask the individual to return for a re-test to rule out a false positive.

## After 1 had the test read, 1 came up positive. What does that mean? Do 1 have TB?

A positive test in a military member most commonly occurs after prolonged or repeated assignments to high-risk areas, such as Africa and the Orient. It does not mean you have active TB. There is a big difference between having the bacteria present in your body (infection) and actually developing active TB disease. People with only the bacteria present have no symptoms, don't feel ill and cannot spread TB to others. However, it's important to treat this inactive TB infection early to prevent developing active TB disease.

## Why do I have to get a test after returning from Southwest Asia?

The reason a TB skin test is accomplished 90 days after leaving an area where TB is more common is because the incubation period for developing the disease is 90 days. If you were exposed the day you left the area, you would show a positive TB skin test around the 90-day point and could get treatment early to prevent the "inactive infection" from progressing into the highly contagious active TB. The Centers for Disease Control recommends a TB skin test 90 days after leaving a problem-prone area and most bases in the Air Force follow suit. However, Air Mobility Command has eliminated the 90-day follow-up in favor of an annual TB skin test for all frequent deployers in hopes of catching those people who re-deploy before they can get the 90day follow-up.



# A mindset for the coming millennium

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The Year 2000 problem started to gain visibility across the world stage about two years ago. The light of examination intensified on organizations developing software and computer systems. The Air Force recognized the problem and put a plan in place to fix computers and software in each weapon and automated information system in the inventory. Policies were drafted, certification processes developed, training performed, contracts changed and tools purchased. The effort has been nothing short of a massive all-out attack to fix the Year 2000 problem within the Air Force. Estimates to eradicate known Year 2000 problems in all of our systems is a staggering \$625 million.

It is astounding to watch this monumental effort unfold. Weapon and automated information systems are being fixed and implemented throughout the Air Force. Infrastructure items such as desktop computers, telephone switches, entry control systems, heating and cooling systems and even computer controlled stoplights are being inventoried and researched to see if product vendors are developing solutions. The sense of urgency concerning Year 2000 problems is undeniable in many functional areas throughout the Air Force. An equal, if not greater, need exists for the operational community to feel that same urgency. This is not just a "comm" problem. The issue of operational readiness for the year 2000 is at hand. The same mindset that has gripped the Air Force communication and information functional area for the past two years needs to permeate everything else we do in the Air Force.

Lt. Gen. William Donahue. Air Force director of communications and information, believes every commander needs to do two things. One, figure out what can cause a mission failure and two, assess the risk of potential service disruptions. The Air Force will hold commanders responsible for systems under their purview. Each major command, field operating agency, direct reporting unit and Air Staff organizations should have an active Year 2000 working group in place and well-supported by leadership. These groups should have every functional area represented and regularly participating. It's important to keep membership of these groups consistent and well supported through the year 2000. The mindset of Year 2000 duty being a part-time obligation for a junior officer needs to change. Commanders at all levels should receive frequent updates from these groups with an emphasis toward mission capability and continuity. What about your

organization? Have you identified your critical missions and mapped out all of their functions and processes? Do you know what systems and infrastructure have problems related to the year

2000? Are contingency plans in place to guarantee

that your mission continues? Have you identified training requirements to ensure your troops can do their jobs in a degraded mode?

In a May 1997 TIG Brief article, then Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald Fogleman declared our people to be the key to realizing our Air Force vision. How do we take care of our people in a worst case Year 2000 failure scenario? Getting your paycheck and feeling assured that your family is safe will go a long way toward focusing on operational efforts. Continuity of operations applies not only to our warfighting missions but also to our services and support missions. We should focus our mindset on these issues and have our best people working on them.

Mindset change occurs over time. An organization requires internal and external forces working on it to change. Raising awareness is key. The Joint Staff now has a war plan mindset for Year 2000 operational readiness. During a recent warfighters' conference, it was briefed that all exercises held during January throughout March of 1999 will have a Year 2000 emphasis at their core. Some organizations are performing a "sticker" campaign on all of their desktop computers and infrastructure items to raise awareness. Others have been mounting public affairs campaigns with news articles, posters and videos. I urge you and your organization to develop a Year 2000 operational readiness "warplan" and create a mindset for the coming millennium. Information, guidance, survival guides, templates and plans concerning all of the issues discussed are available in most major command Year 2000 organizations and certainly at the Air Force Year 2000 Program Management Office web site at http://



